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March 11 2010 
 
Reforms during the 1990s in Russia entailed not only economic liberalization and 
democratization but also transition from a highly centralized unitary state to a highly 
decentralized federal state. Since the advent of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, former 
president BorisYeltsin's experiments with decentralization have been recognized not just 
as unsuccessful but also as leading to the very collapse of Russia. A consensus has 
emerged—among scholars, politicians, and the society at large—that the attempt to build 
a successful federal system in the 1990s badly failed. The new Russian leadership has 
been consistently taking measures since 2000 to recentralize both public finance and 
politics. This chapter addresses the following questions: Why did Yeltsin’s 
decentralization fail? What mistakes (if any) were made in the 1990s? How effective is 
Putin's reversal of Yeltsin’s decentralization? Where is the notorious “vertical of power” 
taking Russia?  
 These questions have no easy answers, but the experience of other federal states 
and an examination of Russia's own political economy of intergovernmental relations, 
considered in this chapter, suggest that the approach being implemented now is no less 
dangerous than the spontaneous decentralization of the 1990s. Indeed, because of the size 
of the country and the heterogeneity of its regions, federalism in Russia is inevitable. As I 
argue below, for the effective functioning of the principles of federalism, Russia needs 
the “vertical of power,” which political economists refer to as political centralization. The 
“verticals,” however, can be different. Other countries’ experience with federalism, 
particularly Mexico and China, shows that the measures that  Putin and company are 
undertaking are unlikely to succeed.  
 Three main lessons emerge from my analysis in this chapter. First, without a 
strong, functioning, and real opposition and free media, the federal center will not be able 
to pursue efficient policies, unless one hopes for a miracle. The fact that such a miracle is 
happening in China is not a guarantee that it can happen on Russian soil. The transition 
process of the last 20 years has clearly demonstrated that transplants do not take root 
without special conditions, and Russia has clearly violated these conditions. 
 Second, federalism combined with the absence of elections at the local level can 
potentially work only when the policy is designed solely to deliver economic growth and 
is not aimed at providing public goods, such as quality education, healthcare, and social 
protection. Such a one-sided goal is politically feasible only in poor countries, but Russia 
is in the higher middle-income group. 
 Third, an alternative to Putin's centralization exists, but it entails a complete 
change of the political system. Obviously it is not easy to implement and obviously 
current leadership does not have an interest in trying to do so, but if implemented, it can 
achieve the balance between political centralization and local accountability necessary for 
effective federalism. This alternative scenario is in building strong national political 
parties, together with maintaining political competition by preserving political opposition 
and free media, as well as holding open and free elections at all levels. 
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Principles of Federalism  
To develop successfully a country needs a system of providing incentives to public 
officials. Incentives are needed to ensure that bureaucrats and politicians work for the 
benefit of the people instead of doing nothing or using public office for private gain. The 
task of creating such a system of incentives for countries with vast territory and diverse 
population is much more complicated than for small and homogeneous states. First, in 
these countries, it is much more difficult, compared with small states, to define what is 
“good for the people.” For example, in large and heterogeneous countries, such as Russia, 
central authorities have much less information about the preferences of people in 
different parts of the country. And often, the available information is not enough for 
central provision of public goods to be effective. Second, central management of a large 
country involves a large state apparatus. Effective control of a large bureaucracy is very 
complicated, expensive, and not always feasible. For these reasons, authority over public 
goods provision should be delegated to lower level governments and hope that they will 
serve the interests of the local population. Because of the vast size and economic and 
ethnic diversity, Russia cannot be managed efficiently from the center as a corporation in 
contrast to, for example, Belarus, Mongolia, or Lithuania. Therefore, the answer to the 
question about whether to delegate authority to the local level is obvious. Instead, the 
question should be: How should decentralization of authority be designed for federalism 
to work in Russia?  
 Based on the experience of developed and wealthy federations, such as the United 
States and Switzerland, many scholars, including such pillars of economic thought as 
Friedrich von Hayek and Charles Mills Tiebout, independently came to the conclusion 
that the delegation of authority to local governments works just fine if three “simple” 
conditions are met. Two of these conditions are necessary to create political incentives 
and one to create economic incentives for local authorities. Conditions for the formation 
of political incentives for efficient work are: 1) mobility, allowing people to “vote with 
their feet,” and 2) development of democracy, allowing people to “vote with their heart.” 
Poorly performing local politicians lose constituent populations or at least votes in 
elections. The third condition is necessary to create economic incentives, also known as 
“fiscal incentives.” In addition to delegating responsibility to provide public goods, a 
functioning federalist system must also delegate the authority to every level of 
government to collect taxes to cover the costs of providing public goods at that level. 
This way local authorities have incentives to provide these public goods efficiently, i.e., 
at the lowest cost.  
 Do these conditions apply to Russian federalism? Are these conditions necessary 
and/or sufficient for Russia? To understand answers to these questions, it is important to 
describe the short history of Russia’s federalism. The history consists of two distinct 
periods with opposite trends: first, Yeltsin’s decentralization of 1991–99; and second, 
Putin’s centralization from 2000 onward. Figures 1 and 2 portray the dynamics of 
subnational expenditure and revenue shares, vividly demonstrating the differences 
between the two periods. Under Yeltsin’s rule, regional shares of revenue and 
expenditure were growing, but when Putin’s assumed power, regional revenue shares 
started declining, while shares of expenditure remained approximately constant.  
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Yeltsin’s Decentralization in the 1990s 
 
Russia of the early 1990s inherited a highly centralized Soviet system of  
intergovernmental fiscal relations, in which the center used financial transfers to the 
regions to maintain the integrity of the empire. These transfers were purely politically 
motivated and did not take into account economic considerations.  
 Fiscal and political decentralization was also driven solely by political reasons. To 
conduct reforms, President Yeltsin needed the support of regional leaders.1 The 
delegation of substantial financial and political autonomy to the regions (in Yeltsin’s own 
words “as much as regions can assume”) in exchange for their loyalty was a forced 
political compromise that allowed liberalization and privatization. Without 
decentralization, through which the center bought temporary support of governors, basic 
liberalization reforms would have been politically infeasible.  
 The transfer of fiscal authority from the center to the regions took the form of 
chaotic informal bargaining, and cash transfers became a tool in the political game. At 
different points in time, they were allocated to loyal regions as a reward or to opposition 
regions as a bribe.2  
 The sequencing of power transfers to the regions was disorderly but far from 
random. Yeltsin gave political autonomy first to the most politically powerful regions: 
two metropolitan areas (St. Petersburg and Moscow) and six republics (not counting 
Chechnya),3 where elections were held in 1991. In addition, Yeltsin allowed elections 
first in the poorest regions with the worst fiscal results. At the end of 1991, a five-year 
moratorium on elections for regional leaders appointed by Yeltsin was proclaimed, but 
during this period 31 regional elections in most economically troublesome regions took 
place with his consent (and two without). This evidence illustrates another important 
political rationale for decentralization: When the economy is not doing well, central 
authorities are interested in political decentralization to push responsibility for poor 
performance of the economy onto subnational governments.  
 Thus, decentralization was conducted purely for political reasons: first, to provide 
support for liberal reforms at the center, which—as everybody expected at first—were 
supposed to produce rapid growth, and subsequently, to push responsibility for the failure 
to deliver the expected economic growth onto the regional governments. Because 
decentralization at the time was politically motivated, its economic effects were never 
considered. Historical and economic analyses of the outcome of Yeltsin’s 
decentralization suggest the chaotic decentralization of the early 1990s certainly 
contributed to the list of reasons why the expected growth did not come about for a long 
time after transition had started. 
 
Principles of Federalism Violated 
                                                 
1 As wonderfully described by Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and 
Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
2 For empirical evidence, see Daniel Treisman, “The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet 
Russia,” British Journal of Political Science 26 (1996): 299–335; Vladimir Popov, “Fiscal Federalism in 
Russia: Rules versus Electoral Politics,” Comparative Economic Studies 44, no. 4 (2004): 515–41; Elena 
Jarocinska, “Are Intergovernmental Grants Tactical? Evidence from Russia,” Economics of Transition 
(forthcoming 2010). 
3 Elections in Chechnya were considered illegitimate. 
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Russia of the 1990s provides an important lesson about what happens when delegation of 
power to local authorities takes place in an environment that is not ideal, i.e., without the 
benchmark principles of federalism from Western democracies mentioned earlier. Indeed, 
Russia violated all three principles. It was characterized by poor local accountability and 
nontransparent division of expenditure responsibilities and revenue assignments. No one, 
but regional business elites, constrained the power of regional governors. Local elections 
rarely worked as a disciplining device, as the election's outcome depended on the 
notorious “administrative resource” rather than the performance of the governors. 
Legislative and judicial powers as well as the local press often were under the direct 
control of the governors and did not provide checks and balances. In addition, low 
mobility of the population due to prohibitively high economic costs of migration in most 
regions made it impossible for people to “vote with their feet,” i.e., to escape from the 
provincial regions to Moscow.4  
 Fragile democratic institutions at the local level made regional governments in 
Russia easily susceptible to “capture” by new wealth. Politically powerful firms 
influenced the rules of the game in the economy: They prevented competition by 
hindering development of  businesses and changed the direction and speed of economic 
reforms.5 The 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey6 
confirmed that state capture was deeply rooted in economic and political processes of the 
country: In the composite index of state capture among 20 transition countries, Russia 
ranked fourth.7  
 Irina Slinko, Evgeny Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya8 created a measure of state 
capture in the Russian regions based on Russian legislation in 1992–2000 and evaluated 
the effects of capture by politically influential firms. Although the study found no robust 
evidence that capture had a significant impact on aggregate economic growth, it showed 
that the economy was suffering from state capture by powerful elites. Firms without 
political influence stagnated; their productivity, sales, and investments declined with an 
increase in state capture of the regions. Growth of regional small businesses was also 
hampered; their share of employment and retail turnover went down with the growth in 
regional capture. Regional budgets were also negatively affected: Tax collection 
decreased and arrears to  budgets increased, leading to a deterioration in regional public 
goods provision.  
                                                 
4 Yuri Andrienko and Sergei Guriev, “Determinants of Interregional Mobility in Russia,” Economics of 
Transition 12, no. 1 (2004): 1–27. 
5 For a theoretical model of state capture with an application to Russia’s context, see Konstantin Sonin, 
“Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights?” Journal of Comparative Economics 31, no. 
4 (2003): 715–31. 
6 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and World Bank, Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), www.worldbank.org. 
7 Joel S. Hellman and Mark Schankerman, “Intervention, Corruption and Capture,” Economics of 
Transition 8, no. 3 (2000): 545–76; Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, Daniel Kaufmann, and Mark 
Schankerman, “Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape 
the Business Environment in Transition Economies,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 
2312 (Washington: World Bank, 2000).  
8 Irina Slinko, Evgeny Yakovlev, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia,” 
American Law and Economics Review 7, no. 1 (2005): 284–318. 
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 A survey of mayors of large Russian cities in 1996 showed that in the first half of 
the 1990s fiscal incentives in the major cities were very weak.9 Revenue sharing between 
regional and local governments provided local governments with no incentive to increase 
the tax base or provide public goods. Both the positive and negative changes in large 
cities’ revenue were almost entirely compensated for by changes in shared revenue 
(through adjustments in tax-sharing rates and size of regional transfers). Alexey 
Makrushin, Slinko, and Zhuravskaya10 conducted a more general study using the same 
methodology and data for more than a thousand municipal budgets for the second half of 
the 1990s. Their results confirm that the additional revenues of municipalities were 
expropriated by regional authorities through changes in the percentage of deductions 
from regulatory taxes and size of the transfer and that this was particularly severe for big 
urban municipalities. Zhuravskaya11 also showed that weak fiscal incentives led to local 
governments’ overregulation of private businesses and deterioration in the level and 
efficiency of public goods provision. 
 The gross mismatch of expenditure responsibilities and taxing authority at all 
levels as well as unclear division of authority/responsibility over them undermined fiscal 
incentives further. Daniel Berkowitz and Wei Li12 studied the consequences of 
overlapping tax bases of different levels of government in Russia in the 1990s. They 
showed that when governments at different levels simultaneously taxed the same base, 
the tax base becomes a common property resource, which leads to overtaxation. Such 
poor division of taxing authority in Russia prompted gross tax evasion, discouraged 
investment, and reduced aggregate tax collections. Berkowitz and Li argued that federal 
and local tax collections had declined steadily in the 1990s, forcing governments at 
various levels to slash expenditures on public goods such as education, police protection, 
public health, transport infrastructure, and law enforcement. 
 Several indepth investigations of intergovernmental relations in Russia of the 
1990s showed that corruption, state capture, and subversion of budget funds arose from 
direct violation of the three principles for the establishment of political and economic 
incentives. These principles are embedded in the constitutions of an overwhelming 
majority of developed federations, such as the United States and Switzerland, but 
developing federations routinely violate these principles, and Russia of the 1990s is only 




Policies that benefit population in one region may directly harm populations of 
neighboring regions and, as a result, hurt the country as a whole. Even if such policies do 
not violate the principles of accountability of local authorities or of correspondence of 
revenues and expenditures and fully reflect the needs of the local people, delegation of 
                                                 
9 See Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism—Russian 
Style,” Journal of Public Economics 76, no. 3 (2000): 337–68. 
10 Alexey Makrushin, Irina Slinko, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “The Reasons for Bad Fiscal Incentives in 
Russia” (policy paper, Center for Economic and Financial Research at the New Economic School, 
Moscow, 2002). 
11 Zhuravskaya, “Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism—Russian Style.” 
12 Daniel Berkowitz and Wei Li, “Tax Rights in Transition Economies: A Tragedy of the Commons?” 
Journal of Public Economics 76, no. 3 (June 2000): 369–97.  
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authority to the local level could lead to truly disastrous outcomes for the country as a 
whole. Thus,  additional conditions need to be formulated to avoid disruptive regionalist 
policies as an outcome of federalism. I return to this issue below as it is highly relevant to 
the development of Russia’s federalism.  
 Indeed, Russia in the 1990s provides a vivid example of one of the most 
important costs of federalism in developing federations, namely, severe interregional 
externalities, which Cai and Treisman13 called “state-corroding federalism.”  
 In the 1990s, regional authorities helped enterprises in their territories avoid 
paying federal taxes. This weakened fiscal capacity of the federal center and undermined 
the provision of federal public goods. Federal tax collection efforts were impaired 
because the agents who carried out tax collection and enforcement in the regions—
formally federal employees—as well as the regional judiciary—formally independent—
were often under the control of regional governments. Aleksei Lavrov, John Litwack, and 
Douglas Sutherland wrote: “…Federal organs operating in the regions typically have 
close relations with the regional administration, depending on the latter for a number of 
reasons, sometimes even for the provision of office space.”14 Ariane Lambert-
Mogiliansky, Konstantin Sonin, and Zhuravskaya document that regional governments 
used the regional judiciary to redistribute tax revenue from the federal center to the 
regions via bankruptcy proceedings.15 Marina Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya show that 
politically strong governors successfully resisted federal tax collection in their regions.16 
Federal arrears were higher and accumulated faster in regions that were in a better 
bargaining position than the centre or where governors had a larger popular base or were 
in open political opposition to the center.17 Moreover, these regions not only managed to 
disrupt the federal government’s tax collection efforts but also were successful in 
bargaining with the centre for official tax deferrals on behalf of regional companies. 
 Interregional trade barriers were also a pervasive phenomenon in Russia in the 
1990s. Berkowitz and David DeJong demonstrate this using evidence on large price 
dispersions across regions.18 Yakovlev summarizes numerous examples of regional 
legislation that set tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in Russia’s regional alcohol 
markets;19 while Sergei Guriev, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya present two case studies 
from beer and copper extraction industries to illustrate that interregional trade barriers 
were particularly strong in regions where politically powerful regional lobbyists 
                                                 
13 Hongbin Cai and Daniel Treisman, “State Corroding Federalism,” Journal of Public Economics, 88 
(2004): 819–43. 
14 Aleksei Lavrov, John M. Litwack, and Douglas Sutherland, Fiscal Federalist Relations in Russia: A 
Case for Subnational Autonomy (Paris: OECD Center for Cooperation with Non-Members, 2001). 
15 Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Konstantin Sonin, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Are Russian Commercial 
Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant,” Journal of Comparative Economics 35, no. 
2 (2007): 254–77.  
16 Marina Ponomareva and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Federal Tax Arrears in Russia: Liquidity Problems, 
Federal Subsidies, or Regional Protection,” Economics of Transition 12, no. 3 (2004): 373–98. 
17 See also Konstantin Sonin, “Provincial Protectionism,” Journal of Comparative Economics (forthcoming 
2010). 
18 Daniel Berkowitz and David N. DeJong, “Russia's Internal Border,” Regional Science and Urban 
Economics 29, no. 5 (September 1999): 633–49. 
19 Evgeny Yakovlev, “Political Economy of Regulation: Case Study of Russian Regional Alcohol 
Markets,” EERC Working Paper (Economics Education and Research Consortium, 2005). 
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concentrated their business interests.20 Overall, interregional protectionism created local 
monopolies and destroyed the single economic space within a country. 
 Uncontrolled access to credit by regional authorities under the security of the 
federal budget and production of money surrogates, such as regional “veksels,” were very 
common in the first half of 1990s and led to disastrous macroeconomic consequences.21  
 Overall, the outcome of Yeltsin’s decentralization in the 1990s was severe: 
deterioration of public goods in general and at the local level in particular; increased 
corruption; high level of state capture at the local level by local elites; fragmentation of 
the country’s economic (market) space into separate autarchic subnational units; 
macroeconomic instability caused by the center’s loss of monopoly power on issuing 
money; and corrosion of the central state due to the loss of instruments for efficient 
collection of federal taxes. By the end of the 1990s, it became apparent that Russia 
needed a reform of federalism.  
 
Reforming State-Corroding Federalism: Lessons from Other Developing Countries 
 
How can a state-corroding federalist system be reformed? This question was on the 
agenda when Putin assumed power and is certainly still relevant to Russia’s present and 
future. Since the problems of Russia's federalism are far from unique—Mexico faced 
similar challenges in the 1920s and 1930s and Argentina and Brazil have been facing 
them since the second half of the last century— the experiences of developing 
federations, including also more successful ones such as China, are useful in finding an 
answer to this question.  
 The solution to the problem of interjurisdictional externalities is in properly 
designed political incentives for local officials. How can one ensure that local officials 
carrying out a regional policy take into account the interests of the population of other 
jurisdictions of the country, while not forgetting about the population of their own 
jurisdiction? There are generally two ways to achieve this. William Riker22 offered one 
practical way. He argued that the essential condition for the existence of an effective 
federation—in addition to the three conditions described above—is the existence of 
strong national political parties that create political incentives for local politicians to 
internalize externalities on neighbors and the center from the regional policy. Strong 
national political parties create political incentives for local politicians by providing 
prospects  for promotion within the party hierarchy based on their actions and by 
supporting them in local elections (when local policies are benign). Strong national 
political parties have enabled the most successful developed federations, such as the 
United States, Australia, and Switzerland, to avoid “too regionalist” policies in their 
states or cantons. Riker argues that having strong national parties are an additional 
(fourth) necessary condition for the success of federalism.  
 Another possible way to prevent regional leaders from pursuing policies that are 
harmful to the country as a whole is for the center to appoint them. If regional leaders are 
                                                 
20 Sergei Guriev, Evgeny Yakovlev, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Interest Group Politics in a Federation,” 
Discussion Paper no. 6671 (Washington: Center for Economic Policy and Research, 2009). 
21 See, for example, Ruben Enikolopov, Alexey Makrushin, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Fiscal Federalism 
in Russia: Problems and Perspectives” (policy paper, Center for Economic and Financial Research at New 
Economic School, Moscow, 2003). 
22 William Riker, Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1964). 
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appointed and not elected, the center can create career concerns for them by basing 
promotions and demotions on their actions.  
 Olivier Blanchard and Andrei Shleifer compare Russia’s and China’s fiscal 
decentralizations and argue that China provides a good example of how the center should 
create conditions under which regional governments have no incentives to pursue policies 
with negative externalities using such “administrative federalism.”23 It is important to 
note that even though China is a highly politically centralized unitary state, from an 
economic standpoint it is a federation; provincial leaders have substantial and exclusive 
authority over many aspects of regional fiscal and regulatory policy. In particular, 
provincial leaders in China, i.e., provincial party secretaries and governors, have 
sufficient discretion over policy that they can substantially affect economic growth in 
their territory, but there is plenty of evidence that their policies are less “regionalist” than 
those of many other developing federations (including Russia). Blanchard and Shleifer 
argue that the provincial leaders’ need to please the center for reappointment explains 
their less regionalist actions. Thus, the Chinese Communist Party is a watchdog ensuring 
that provincial leaders act in the national interest. Many scholars agree that the 
unprecedented high economic growth in China over the past 30 years indeed is linked to 
Chinese federalism, i.e., the synthesis of substantial fiscal autonomy of provinces and 
strict administrative subordination of provincial governments to the center. 
 However, Chinese-style federalism has its problems. First, the administrative 
power of the center leads to a situation where local authorities are not accountable to their 
population and, therefore, lose interest in the needs of local people and act solely in the 
interests of the central government. This, in theory, should undermine one of the main 
advantages of federalism (why a country would want to decentralize in the first place), 
namely, the closeness of local governments to the local population, which creates 
important informational advantages over the central government.24 Chinese federalism 
was a result of fast economic growth, which in turn was a consequence of local public 
policies supporting businesses and market infrastructure. However, little progress is 
observed in public goods provision to the population, such as education, health care, and 
social protection, which is still rudimentary. 
 Why do observers who admire Chinese federalism largely ignore this issue? The 
reason is that a country has different priorities at different stages of development. China 
is a rapidly growing but poor country. At this stage, the central government can afford 
not to make public goods provision a priority over growth. However, as China develops,  
priorities will change, and this change will seriously challenge the Chinese system of 
federalism. The reason is a standard moral hazard problem with multitasking: Multiple 
goals undermine the power of the incentive scheme created by administrative federalism. 
As Russia is a lot richer than China, it may not be politically feasible for Russia’s central 
government to deem public goods provision a less important objective and ignore it.  
 The second fundamental problem with the Chinese system of federalism, and 
perhaps the most important for Russia, is that this system, as any miracle, cannot be 
replicated. It is a miracle that in China the central government, whose power is in no way 
                                                 
23 Olivier Blanchard and Andrei Shleifer, “Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China 
versus Russia,” in Transition Economies: How Much Progress? IMF Staff Paper (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund, 2001).  
24 Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). 
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limited due to the autocratic nature of the communist party, acts in the interests of 
national economic growth and  not in its own interests of rent seeking.  
 Ruben Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya25 use panel data on 75 developing and 
transition countries over the past 25 years to show that the presence of strong national 
political parties indeed has a positive effect on fiscal decentralization (confirming Riker’s 
idea), whereas administrative appointments of local authorities by the center (instead of 
local elections), on average, do not improve public goods or the quality of governance in 
developing federations. Interestingly, abolition of local elections, on average, does not 
improve federalism, even in very young democracies, where, apparently, elections on the 
ground do not work at all as an institution of accountability. The important reason for this 
lies in the incentives for rent-seeking in the center.  
 Analysis of the Chinese experience and that of a wide range of countries suggests 
that a prerequisite for well-functioning administrative federalism is benevolence of the 
representatives of central authority, i.e., despite the many opportunities for rent-seeking, 
they think and act  to accelerate economic growth and improve public welfare. 
Unfortunately, this condition is grossly violated in most countries,  be it a young or 
mature democracy or dictatorship. Fewer the constraints on executives, the more likely 
rent-seeking is at the central level. Thus, for Russia, administrative federalism is a dead-
end. At present, Chinese federalism, without a doubt, is one of the most interesting and 
important puzzles for economics and political and other social sciences. No more or less 
convincing explanation exists yet for why politicians and bureaucrats in Beijing are doing 
everything they can to support economic growth. And since there is no such explanation, 
there is no reason to see the Chinese experience as a guide to action but as just a miracle.  
 Another important example for Russia is the story of Mexico in the 1920s 
and1930s, which was developing much like Russia in the 1990s. In the 1950s, the ruling 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) gave leaders of Mexican states attractive career 
prospects in the federal government. The strengthening of the party's political influence 
in the states  streamlined the tax system and substantially restrained the states’ 
protectionist policies. This resulted in significant economic growth coupled with low 
inflation in the 1950s and 1970s, often referred to as the “Mexican miracle.”  
 Political centralization, however, did not stop at this first stage that  greatly 
benefited economic growth. Economic and fiscal centralization followed. By the 1980s, 
the PRI faced no political opposition, and, because of lack of accountability at the center, 
party elites mainly focused on extraction of rents and strengthening their own power, 
rather than on effective federalist policies. The central government became interested in 
gaining control over fiscal resources. Under a one-party system (PRI), there were no 
commitment devices to stop recentralization. As a result, local authorities lost fiscal 
autonomy, which significantly reduced their incentives to pursue growth-promoting 
policies. In the end, in the late 1990s, massive centralization led to a series of crises, and 
the PRI lost power. Mexico in the 1980s is a clear example of how no political opposition 
poses a major systemic threat to administrative federalism: Federal officials who have a 
great deal of political power cannot commit to refraining from stripping fiscal autonomy 
of the regions, which in turn undermines the basic idea of federalism. In other words, in 
the absence of political opposition and political competition, federalism may not be 
                                                 
25 Ruben Enikolopov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Decentralization and Political Institutions,” Journal of 
Public Economics 91, no. 11-12 (2007): 2261–90. 
 10
sustainable as the center would want to recentralize all powers, including fiscal powers.  
 
Putin’s Centralization: Follow Mexico or China?  
 
 
To address the severe problems brought about by Yeltsin’s federalism, President Putin 
started reforming the state apparatus soon after assuming power. This reform largely 
seemed to follow Blanchard and Shleifer’s advice.Though never officially declared, 
President Putin took the Chinese example as a model for reform of Russia's federalism. 
From 2000 to 2004, Putin undertook a number of important steps to increase the political 
influence of the central government and reduce that of regions on policy design and its 
implementation at all levels.  
 Changes in the formation of the upper house of Russia’s parliament (the 
Federation Council) and the establishment of federal districts and presidential envoys to 
these districts marked the beginning of this process. Both of these measures took place in 
2000. The first one significantly reduced the influence of governors on the federal 
legislation. Governors and the heads of regional legislatures—formerly ex-officio 
members of the Federation Council—were replaced by designated professional 
representatives. The second measure was intended to increase federal control over the 
implementation of federal legislation on the ground; previously, such control was almost 
completely absent. Soon after presidential envoys were introduced, it became clear that 
they were significantly less legitimate and less politically powerful compared with 
elected governors.  
 The next reform step was declared on September 13, 2004, when Putin announced 
significant changes in the formation of state apparatus. Elections of regional governors 
were cancelled starting January 2005 and from then onward the president personally 
appointed governors. Direct majoritarian elections in single-member districts, which 
previously existed for one-half of the seats in the lower house of Russia’s parliament, the 
Duma, were replaced with proportional representation from party lists with simultaneous 
increase in the threshold required for parties to qualify for election. The administration’s 
explanations for these drastic measures came later and were in line with the Chinese 
model and very much in the spirit of Blanchard and Shleifer: Putin called these reforms 
“the logical development of Russia’s federalism.” The need to restore the “vertical of 
power” was why regional elections were abolished. The need to strengthen the party 
system was why parliamentary elections were reformed.  The latter corresponds quite 
well with Riker’s idea.  
 Important reforms of intergovernmental fiscal relations also took place starting in 
1999. These reforms aimed at and largely achieved streamlining of intergovernmental 
transfers with the help of a transparent grant-allocation formula and eliminated federal 
expenditure mandates to regions that were not financed with appropriate federal transfers. 
These certainly were important changes for the better.26. 
 Enough time has passed since these changes were implemented to observe the 
                                                 
26 I focus on the political side of Putin’s reform in this chapter; for a detailed account of the fiscal side, see 
Migara O. De Silva, Galina Kurlyandskaya, Elena Andreeva, and Natalia Golovanova, Intergovernmental 
Reforms in the Russian Federation: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? (Washington: World Bank, 
2009). 
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outcomes of Putin’s centralization. In particular, enough data are available to judge 
whether the reform had the desired effects on the extent of state capture at the regional 
level and on career concerns for regional leaders.  
 Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya27 show that despite political centralization there have 
been no significant changes in the overall level of state capture at the regional level in 
Russia between Yeltsin’s era and Putin’s first term in power. Figure 3 portrays the 
dynamics of two measures of regional capture: the number and concentration of 
preferential treatment of particular large regional firms by regional legislation.  
 However, there has been an important change in the nature of the most influential 
groups between the two periods: Bargaining power within regions has shifted from 
private firms, particularly those belonging to the largest industrial groups, as well as from 
firms owned by regional governments to firms owned by the federal government. Firms 
that belong to the federal government have become the most politically powerful 
lobbyists at the regional level. Thus, instead of limiting the extent of state capture, Putin’s 
reform so far has only changed the identity of the captors. This, however, may have 
actually restrained some of the negative externalities of regionalist policies as firms in 
federal ownership probably internalize some of these external effects (as shown by 
Guriev, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya28 using trade barriers as an example). Yet, the 
“vertical of power” should have led to a decline in the overall level of capture as the 
central government was supposed to reinstate equal treatment of firms by regional law 
and government regulations. Putin’s centralization clearly failed to meet this objective.  
  
 Over the course of 2005–07, Putin made 74 decisions about appointments of 
regional leaders. In 2005, 33 governors were reappointed and 9 were dismissed. In 2006, 
5 were reappointed and 3 were dismissed. In 2007, 12 governors were reappointed and 12 
were dismissed. It is interesting to see whether the decision to reappoint a particular 
governor depends on the economic performance of the region.29 A very simple 
calculation of average real annual growth rates of the regions starting in 2003 up to the 
time of reappointment shows that, if anything, the correlation between the reappointment 
and economic performance of the region is negative (figure 4).  
 The pair-wise correlation is statistically insignificant and becomes significant 
once we control for the 2002 level of per capita gross regional product. It is clear from 
the figure (and is confirmed by regression analysis) that the statistical significance of the 
negative correlation depends on few outliers: replacement of Alu Alhanov by young 
Ramzan Kadyrov in March 2007 in Chechnya, of Ivan Malahov by Alexander 
                                                 
27 Evgeny Yakovlev and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “State Capture: From Yeltsin to Putin,” in Corruption, 
Development and Institutional Design, ed. János Kornai, L. László Mátyás, and Gérard Roland (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillian, 2009). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Many studies have shown that provincial economic growth is the main determinant of promotions and 
demotions of Chinese provincial leaders. See, for instance, Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, “Political 
Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,” Journal of 
Public Economics 89, no. 9-10 (2005): 1743–62; Ye Chen, Hongbin Li, and Li-An Zhou, “Relative 





Horoshavin in Sakhalin oblast after the Nevelsk earthquake,  of Roman Abramovitch in 
Chukotka in November 2005, and  of Kirsan Ilyumzhinov in Kalmykia also in November 
2005. In any case, there is clearly no evidence of a positive relationship between 
economic performance and regional reappointments. 
  But even without looking at exact numbers, it is evident that many of the 
reappointed governors have violated federal laws and some are leaders of local mafias. 
The most striking example is the reappointment of the governor of the Republic of 
Kalmykia, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov. For 12 years under the leadership of Ilyumzhinov (before 
his reappointment by Putin), Kalmykia was one of the least developed and  poorest 
regions. During this time, Kalmykia was the only region in Russia's history to  declare 
bankruptcy as outstanding debts of the republic exceeded its annual budget. Federal 
investigations suggested that federal transfers systematically disappeared without a trace 
from Kalmykia’s budget. According to Rosstat, in 1993, when Ilyumzhinov was first 
elected head of the republic, in terms of per capita income of the population, it was the 
seventh poorest region of all Russian regions (excluding autonomous Okrugs), and after 
ten years of Ilyumzhinov’s governance, Kalmykia moved up to third place. 
Unemployment in the republic also has grown significantly, and by the time of 
Ilumzhimov’s reappointment, unemployment was lower than that only a few regions in 
the Caucasus. There is little doubt that Ilyumzhinov is grossly unpopular in the republic. 
In order to get re-elected for the third term, Ilyumzhinov completely squeezed the 
opposition in the region. Numerous extremely serious violations of election legislation 
were documented. Despite these and many other gross actions, Ilyumzhinov gained the 
trust of President Putin to lead the region again in 2005.  
 An important question is why a strong central leader would want to reappoint 
badly behaving governors? One reason is political motivation. Inefficient governors are 
unpopular and, therefore, cannot become independent political figures and cannot (even 
potentially) lead the opposition to the ruling central government. Second, and perhaps the 
easiest explanation, is rent-seeking. The central government can use the threat of 
dismissal to persuade local authorities to give greater part of their rents to federal 
officials. It is obvious that rent-seeking regional governors can offer a larger sum for their 
reappointment. Moreover, incumbents have more information and rents and collect them 
better than outsiders; thus, they can pay more for their jobs. 
  Of course, it is theoretically possible that changing the system of appointment will 
radically change the behavior of governors, because their incentive structure would 
change, which means that it is irrelevant how they behaved before the reform. However, 
governors who have engaged in rent-seeking behavior for years must have accumulated 
implicit obligations to special interest groups in their regions, and the interests of these 
groups do not always coincide with those of the public at large. To break such ties 
between local governors and local elites, the central reformer interested in streamlining a 
state-corroding federalist system needs to bring in new people. Thus, even in a  case 
where  federal officials have absolute integrity  (which I mentioned earlier in the context 
of transplanting Chinese federalism to Russia), it would make sense to fire most 
governors who held office under the old system. Yet, as of November 2009, 24 governors 





Russia has much to learn from other developing federations. First, for successful 
development, it needs a federal structure of government, as the country is too large and 
too diverse to be a unitary state. Second, effective operation of Russia's federalism is  
possible only if there is a strong political “vertical,” which would limit inefficient 
regionalist policies of individual subjects. However, creation of the administrative 
vertical by abolishing regional elections, as Putin did, has created two major problems for 
Russia: (1) inadequate provision of public goods in the absence of accountability of local 
governments to the local population, and (2) complete dependence on the utopian 
assumption of honesty and self-limitation of federal authorities, without which 
administrative federalism is unsustainable.  
 The alternative to administrative federalism is creation of a political “vertical” 
through strong national political parties. Strong national parties, while preserving local 
elections, maintain the balance of political incentives for local authorities between the 
interests of  regional and national populations. However, successful operation and 
sustainability of this approach requires institutional constraints on the central organs of 
the ruling party as insurance against use of the “vertical”  for personal gain by senior 
party and government officials. The only effective way to create such a system of checks 
and balances of federal officials and party bosses is the development of democracy, i.e., 
strong national opposition parties and independent media, both at national and 
subnational levels. Unfortunately, it is pretty clear that the Russian leadership interprets 
the concept of a “strong political party system” not as having strong opposition but as 
Mexico’s PRI system in the late 1980s.  
 Even in the zero-probability event that a “Russian miracle” occurs in the absence 
of political competition, just as in China, there will always be a great danger that officials 
focused on the welfare of the population will be replaced at some point by those focusing 
mainly on their own well-being. Therefore, long-term success of federalism in Russia 
depends hugely on promoting democracy at all levels. Russia has a long way to go in 
establishing democratic institutions (and so far the trend has been in the opposite 
direction), but it is the only way for Russia’s federalism to work.  
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Figure 1 Share of subnational expenditures in total outlays of national and subnational governments 

















Figure 2 Share of subnational revenues in total revenues of national and subnational 
















Figure 3 Extent of state capture measured by the number and 
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Mátyás, and Gérard Roland (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2009).
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